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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE

STATE OF UTAH

ADRIANA CORNELIA PEARSON,
Plaintiff-Appellant

)
)

vs.

)

KIMBER LEE PEARSON,

)

CASE NO. 17094

Defendant-Respondent. )

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
NATURE OF CASE

A Motion by a divorced husband to set aside Default
Judgment

entered in the Decree of Divorce was granted by

the Court and from the granting of that Motion this Appeal
has arisen.
DISPOSITION IN A LOWER COURT
The Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup set aside the Decree
of Divorce previously entered pursuant to a Default.
RELIEF SOUGHT BY RESPONDENT
Defendant-Respondent seeks to have this Appeal
dismissed due to the fact that there is no final Judgment
or in the alternative, for an Order upholding and sustaining
the Order entered by Judge Rigtrup setting aside the Decree of
Divorce.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
The parties were husband and wife and initially filed

a Divorce Complaint in 1977 and later reconciled. ( R-2 ) •
An Amended Complaint for Divorce was filed in February
of 1979.

(

) Defendant-Respondent went to the

R-16

Law Office of Plaintiff's attorney and, at that visit,
accepted and signed an Acceptance of Service and Consent to
Default.

Defendant understood that the purpose of signing the

Acceptance of Service Form was to eliminate the need for him
to appear in Court.

After he had accepted service of the

Summons and Complaint, Defendant-Respondent, Plaintiff and
Plaintiff's attorney did have a discussion in Plaintiff
attorney's law office and an agreement was reached between
the parties settling all the terms and conditions of the
Divorce.

Said agreement was substantially different from the-

allegations contained in the Amended Complaint (

R-35

).

Defendant never executed a Stipulation, Waiver and Property
Settlement Agreement setting forth the exact terms and conditions of the agreement between the parties and never received
a copy of the Decree of Divorce, even though one had been requested.

(

R-35

).

At the time the Defendant-Respondent was preparing to
enter into another marriage in July of 1979 he reviewed the
Divorce file and discovered that the Decree did not conform to
the agreement between the parties and had been taken on a
Default basis and based solely upon those allegations in the
Amended Complaint.

( R-35

& R-28

.

).

Defendant-Respondent

had no knowledge of the discrepancy between the Decree as granted
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and the agreement between the parties prior to July 26, 1979.
(

R-36

)

Defendant-Respondent immediately contacted

an attorne~ a Motion to Set Aside the Decree or to modify the
same was brought before the Court and that Motion was granted.
(

R-39

I

R-54

) •

At no time did the Defendant agree to the specific terms
and conditions of the Amended Complaint.

And at no time was a

Stipulation, Waiver and Property Settlement Agreement prepared
and entered into by the parties.
After this Appeal was filed Defendant-Respondent filed
a Motion to Dismiss based upon the fact that there was no final
Judgment from which Plaintiff-Appellant could appeal.
That Motion was tentatively denied by this Court with
final ruling differed until hearing on the merits.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
GRANTING OF A MOTION TO SET ASIDE A DEFAULT JUDGMENT
IS NOT A FINAL RULING FROM WHICH APPEAL CAN BE TAKEN
AND THEREFORE THIS APPEAL SHOULD BE DISMISSED.
The right to appeal is specifically set forth in Rule
72 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and provides as
follows:
RULE 72
RIGHT OF APPEAL; SCOPE OF REVIEW; PARTIES
a.

From final (Orders and) Judgments.
An appeal may be taken to the Supreme
Court from all final Orders and Judgments
in accordance with these rules; ....

Defendant submits that the granting of a Motion
to Set Aside a Default Judgment and a Decree of Divorce is not
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(3)

a final order or a Judgment which can be appealed from.
At this point in time there is not an Order of the Court
specifically changing the terms and conditions of the
original Decree and therefore the requisite finality has
not been met.
The general rule is set forth in 4 Am. Jur. 2d,
Section 126 at 641 in which it is indicated:
"Insofar as an Order granting such
a Motion is concerned, the weight
of the authority appears to be that,
ordinarily, Appeal or Writ of Error
will not lie to an Order merely
vacating a former Judgment, such
an Order not being final."
Section 127 of the same authority indicates the
following:
"The Courts agree that an Order setting
aside or refusing to set aside a default
where Judgment has not been entered is
not a final Order and therefore is not
appealable unless it falls within the
scope of a statutory provision allowing
direct appeal from certain types of
interlocutory_ decision."
Defendant submits that no Judgment has been entered
from which Plaintiff-Appellant can appeal and pursuant
the general rule such an appeal can only be timely after
the entry of such a Judgment.

Defendant further submits

that the nature of this appeal does not lend itself to
an interlocutory

appeal nor has permission been granted

for such an appeal.
This Court in the case of Baer v. Young, 25 U2d 198,
479 P. 2d 351 (1971) indicated that an appeal from an Order
setting aside a Default Judgment was interlocutory
Sponsored
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Procedure.
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in nature
Rule~ of

The setting aside of a Default Judgment entitles
the Defendant to another hearinq on the merits in order
to obtain a final Judgment or a Decree based upon that
hearing.

Therefore, the granting of a Motion to Set Aside

Default Judgment is directly analoygousto the granting of
a Motion for a new trial.

The same general rules, as applied

in a new trial situation apply in the granting of a
4 Arn. Jur. 2d Section 123 at

Motion to Set Aside a Default.

638 states the general rule as follows:
"In the absence of statute requiring a different
result, the general rule ·seems to be that there
is no direct appeal from an Order denying or
granting a Motion for a new trial. The holding that an Order denying or granting a Motion
for a new trial is not directly appealable has
usually been based on the ground of lack of
finality of the particular decision."
This Court has unheld the general rule and has so stated
in the case of Haslam v. Paulsen,

15 U 2d 185, 389 P. 2d 736

(1964), in which the Court stated as follows:
"The Order granting a new trial is not a
final Judgment, it but sets aside the
verdict and places the parties in the
same position as if there had been no
previous trial."
Defendant submits that the Plaintiff's appeal should
be dismissed based upon the settled

law in the State of

Utah that an appeal under Rule 72a of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure cannot be made from a Motion granting relief
from a Default.

Plaintiff's only alternative would have been

to seek an interlocutory

appeal.
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(5)

POINT II
THE COURT HAS SUFFICIENT GROUNDS TO SET ASIDE
THE DEFAULT DIVORCE ENTERED IN THIS SITUATION
UNDER RULE 60(b) 7 OF THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE.
Defendant brought this Motion under Rule 60(b)
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and the Court
_ specifically found that there were sufficient grounds
under Rule 60{b)7, which provide relief from a Default
may be had for "any other reason justifying relief from
the operation of the Judgment."
The Court after hearing the facts and circumstances
and argument in this particular regard concluded that the
facts and circumstances surrounding this Default did
justify setting aside the Divorce Decree in numerous particulars and of the Decree of Divorce appeared to be inequitable
upon its face.
This Court has stated the standard for granting of a
Rule 60(b) Motion in the case of Warren v. Dixon Ranch
Company, 123 Utah 416, 260 P. 2d 741, {1953)as follows:
"The allowance of a vacation of a Judgment
is a creature of equity designed to relieve
against harshness of enforcing a Judgment,
which may occur through procedural dif f icul ties, the wrongs of the oposing party,
or misfortunes which prevent the presentation
of a claim or defense . . . . {A)n Equity Court
• • • • may exercise wide judicial discretion
in weighing the factors of fairness and public
convenience, and this Court on appeal will
reverse the trial Court only where an abuse
of discretion is clearly shown".
The Court heard argument in this particular regard
and was convinced that there was sufficient grounds under
the notion of equity to set aside this Judgment.
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(6)

The

Decree of Divorce specifically awards the entire interest in
the home of the parties to the Plaintiff, awards her majority
of the personal property and obligates the Defendant to pay
the majority of the debts and obligations of the parties.

These

factors considered in light of the fact that Defendant alleges
that after the acceptance of the Summons and Complaint a
discussion was had and an agreement reached substantially differing from the obligations in the Complaint gave the Court suf f icient and substantial cause to set aside the Judgment entered
herein.
This Court in a recent case of Boyce v. Boyce No. 16342
(filed March 5, 1980) indicated that :
"A liberal standard for the application
of Rule 60(b) in Divorce cases is justified
by the Doctrine of Continuing Jurisdiction
that a Divorce Court has over its Decrees.
Clearly, -a Court should modify a prior Decree
when the interests of equity and fair dealing
with the Court and the opposing parties so
require".
Defendant submits that under the liberal standards set
forth in the foregoing cases and the law in the State of Utah
there was no abuse of discretion in setting aside this Decree.
Plaintiff-Respondent sites the case of McGavin v. McGavin,
27 U 2d 200, 494 P. 2d 283 (1972)in support of the proposition
that there was an abuse of discretion by the District Court.
Defendant submits that the McGavin case dealt specifically with
the issue of paternity and fraud based upon that paternity.
This Court indicated that in a situation of that nature a
separate action could more readily handle the situation
then a Motion to Set Aside the Decree of Divorce.

Defendant

submits that that is not the situation presently confronting
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The issues are specifically those issues contained in the
Decree of Divorce and not paternity issues as in the McGavin
case.

Defendant also reinterates that this Motion was granted

under Rule 60(b) 7 and therefore the three (3) month provision
relating to Rule 60(b) 1 through 4 is not applicable.
that Defendant's

Plaintiff-Appellant also argues

Motion was denied under 60(b)(l)through(3). There is nothing
in the_recor4 _indicating

~~id

denial and, in fact, it is

contrary to the ruling of the Court.

Defendant alleged

numerous grounds entitling him to relief under Rule 60(b)
and the Court granted his Motion under Rule

60(b) 7.

POINT III
THE SITUATION IN THE PRESENT CASE IS SUBSTANTIALLY
DIFFERENT FROM THE SITUATION IN WHICH THE PARTIES
TO A DIVORCE HAVE EXECUTED AND
SIGNED A STIPULATION
WAIVER AND PROPERTY "SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT SPECIFICALLY
CONTRACTING AND AGREEING TO ALL THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF THE DIVORCE.
In the present case no Stipulation, Waiver and Property
Settlement Agreement was executed between the parties setting
forth the specific terms and conditions to be incorporated in
the Decree.

Defendant was merely presented with a copy of the

Summons and Complaint and he alleges that thereafter an agreement
was reached between himself, his wife and his wife's attorney
substantially modifying the terms contained in the Complaint.
It was his understanding that the Acceptance of Service
was merely for the purpose of

eliminating his need to appear

in Court.
Plaintiff-Appellant cites the cases of Kessimakis v.
Kessimakis, 546

:r.

2d 888

(1976) and Land v. Land,_ 605 P. 2d
: ··-~
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(8)

1248 (1980} in support of their argument that the Court
abused its discretion in this case.

Defendant submits

that in both the Kessimakis and the Land case specific
stipulations had been entered into.

In both of those

cases a Stipulation, Waiver and Property Settlement Agreement had been executed outlining all the specific terms and
conditions of the Divorce and these same terms and conditions
were then incorporated in the Decree.

In that type of

situation Plaintiff's argument concerning a contract between
the parties bears substantial weight.

In the present

situation the Acceptance of Service by the Defendant certainly
cannot be granted the same contractual weight as in those other
cases.

Even the quotation cited by Plaintiff-Appellant in

regard to the Land case indicates :
" • • • . when a Decree is based on a property
settlement • . . . "
Therefore the principals enunciated in those cases do not
apply to a situation in which no property settlement was
arrived at.

Defendant has alleged that a separate agreement

was reached between the parties at the time he accepted service,
but that agreement was not incorporated in the Decree of Divorce
and that the Decree was inequitable and should be set aside.
CONCLUSION
Defendant hereby submits that Plaintiff's Appeal
should be dismissed for lack of a final judgment from which
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tn\

to appeal.

The law is clear that an appeal of the nature

attempted by Plaintiff is untimely and without basis

in law.
The District Court did not abuse its discretion

in setting aside the Default Judgment. Sufficient grounds
~ere

alleged and the Court, in the interest of justice,

after hearing the facts and circumstances, certainly was well
within the standards set forth by this Court.
Plaintiff's Appeal should be dismissed or in the
alternative an Order from this Court should uphold the ·
ruling of Judge Rigtrup and remand this matter for further
hearing to the District Court.
Respectfully submitted this
1981.

eils E. Mo tenson
Attorney for Defendant-Respondent
255 East 400 South
Suite 210
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone:
328-1392
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I hereby certify that on the

~ayof

1981, I mailed, postage prepaid, a true and c
above and foregoing Respondent's Brief to Randy Ludlow Attorney
at Law, 325 South Third East, S lt Lake City, Utah

84111.
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